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We discuss the evolution in macroeconomic thought on the monetary policy transmission mechanism
and present related empirical evidence. The core channels of policy transmission – the neoclassical
links between short-term policy interest rates, other asset prices such as long-term interest rates, equity
prices, and the exchange rate, and the consequent effects on household and business demand – have
remained steady from early policy-oriented models (like the Penn-MIT-SSRC MPS model) to modern
dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium (DSGE) models. In contrast, non-neoclassical channels, such
as credit-based channels, have remained outside the core models. In conjunction with this evolution
in theory and modeling, there have been notable changes in policy behavior (with policy more focused
on price stability) and in the reduced form correlations of policy interest rates with activity in the United
States. Regulatory effects on credit provision have also changed significantly. As a result, we review
the empirical evidence on the changes in the effect of monetary policy actions on real activity and
inflation and present new evidence, using both a relatively unrestricted factor-augmented vector autoregression
(FAVAR) and a DSGE model. Both approaches yield similar results: Monetary policy innovations
have a more muted effect on real activity and inflation in recent decades as compared to the effects
before 1980. Our analysis suggests that these shifts are accounted for by changes in policy behavior
and the effect of these changes on expectations, leaving little role for changes in underlying private-sector
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The monetary transmission mechanism is one of the most studied areas of monetary economics 
for two reasons.  First, understanding how monetary policy affects the economy is essential to 
evaluating what the stance of monetary policy is at a particular point in time.  Even if a central 
bank’s policy instrument, for example, the federal funds rate in the United States, is low, 
monetary policy may well be restrictive because of effects that monetary policy has had on other 
asset prices and quantities.   Second, in order to decide on how to set policy instruments, 
monetary policymakers must have an accurate assessment of the timing and effect of their 
policies on the economy.  To make this assessment, they need to understand the mechanisms 
through which monetary policy impacts real economic activity and inflation. 
  Over the last thirty years there have been dramatic changes in the way financial markets 
operate.  In addition, the conduct of monetary policy has also changed in dramatic ways, with an 
increased focus on achieving price stability.  And research in monetary economics has stimulated 
new thinking on how monetary policy can affect the economy, leading to further evolution in our 
understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism.  All of these developments suggest that 
there is a strong possibility that there have been changes in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. 
  A first look at the data shows notable differences in the reduced-form correlations 
between aggregate economic activity or various components of private expenditure and the 
short-term nominal policy interest rate in the United States in the most recent decades from the 
correlations that prevailed in the decades prior to the Volcker disinflation and numerous   ‐2‐
regulatory changes that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  Figure 1 plots the correlation 
between the growth rates of output (real GDP), four components of private expenditure 
(nondurables and services consumption, durables consumption, residential investment, and 
nonresidential investment), and the nominal federal funds rate (both lagged and led four quarters) 
for the periods from 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 (the blue bars) and from 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 (the red 
bars).  The correlations shifted notably across these periods: In the earlier sample, growth in 
aggregate activity and expenditure was negatively correlated with the nominal federal funds rate, 
especially with lags of the nominal federal funds rate; in the latter sample, growth in aggregate 
activity and expenditure was positively correlated with the nominal funds rate, especially with 
leads of the nominal federal funds rate.   
  These changes may suggest changes in the effects of interest rate movements on demand; 
indeed, an uneducated look at the positive correlation between output growth and the nominal 
interest rate in recent decades might lead an observer to suggest, naively, that efforts by the 
monetary authority to bring about stronger economic growth should raise short-term interest 
rates, not lower them.  Alternatively, these changes may reflect changes in the behavior of 
policymakers – for example, a more systematic approach that focuses on stability in inflation and 
economic activity which implies a positive correlation between the policy interest rate and 
economic growth due to policymaker’s tendency to lean against strengthening in demand. 
  We start our analysis by reviewing the various channels of monetary policy transmission 
and how our understanding of them has changed.  We then discuss how developments in the 
financial markets and the conduct of monetary policy may have caused these transmission 
mechanisms to change.    This discussion is followed by our summary of empirical work on the 
evolution of the monetary transmission mechanism and our independent analysis, where we   ‐3‐
focus on the potential pitfalls associated with alternative identification strategies, the changes in 
statistical relationships that appear most robust, and structural interpretations of changes in the 
links between short-term interest rate movements and real activity. 
  Our analysis is structured around two approaches.  The first is based on vector 
autoregressions (VARs).  In this part of our analysis, we build on, for example, the survey by 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) by expanding their analysis to include the more recent 
factor-augmented VAR (or FAVAR) approach (e.g., Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz, 2005), which 
allows consideration of a larger set of information.  This shift leads to an analysis of a larger 
range of economic variables; one particular area on which we focus is inflation expectations, as 
our overall analysis will lead us to conclude that shifts in the management of expectations may 
be among the most important changes in the relationship between monetary policy and aggregate 
economic activity.  We also emphasize the changes in the effects of monetary policy shocks, or 
lack thereof, much more than the earlier literature.
1  Subsequent to this analysis, we present a 
structural analysis using a dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium (DSGE) model.  This form of 
analysis will allows us to consider changes in monetary policy effects and the impact of changes 
in monetary policy behavior, so as to ensure that shifts in reduced-form correlations are not 
simply related to changes in policy behavior as noted by Lucas (1976).  We will also consider a 
number of plausible structural changes through this lens.  Our analysis in this vein builds on, for 
example, Smets and Wouters (2007) and the increasing use of such structural models at central 
banks (e.g., Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne, 2008, and Edge, Kiley, and Laforte, 2007, 2008, 
forthcoming). 
                                                            
1 With that said, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) did examine changes in the effect of monetary policy 
shocks, and found only limited evidence for such changes conditional on the size of the policy shock; we will reach 
similar conclusions along some dimensions.  These authors did find much smaller shocks in recent samples, as we 
will.   ‐4‐
  These two approaches – VAR and DSGE – span the range from relatively unstructured to 
highly structured.  An intermediate approach, adopted in, for example, Akhtar and Harris (1987), 
Friedman (1989), Mauskopf (1990), and Fair (2004) specifies equations for various categories of 
expenditure using information from economic theory on the plausible set of determinants and 
“Cowles Commission” econometrics.  Our results will in many ways be similar to those from 
this literature – which largely concluded that the evidence for changes in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism was limited.  Nonetheless, we see aspects of our analysis as 
representing a substantial step forward – both in exploiting a large set of information and 
imposing only limited identifying assumptions (as in the FAVAR approach) and in moving to the 
other extreme to try to address the Lucas critique and consider the “management of 
expectations”, which Woodford (2003) emphasizes is a primary transmission channel. 
  Several results stand out from our review and analysis.  First, changes at the 
macroeconomic level are difficult to detect:  Relatively unrestricted approaches using 
macroeconomic data, such as analyses using vector-autoregressions (VARs), suffer from the 
curse of dimensionality and have reached different conclusions regarding the importance of time 
variation in the links between monetary policy and macroeconomic activity; more restricted 
structural approaches are more controversial.  Nonetheless, the data do suggest certain changes 
that are important for monetary transmission. Overall, the responses of measures of real activity 
and prices have become smaller and more persistent since 1984. Also, changes in government 
regulation and financial innovations related to housing finance in the United States seem to have 
altered the response of residential investment to changes in monetary policy in recent decades 
from that in earlier periods (and studies examining a range of countries have noted the 
importance of such changes around the world).  Perhaps more clearly in the data for the United   ‐5‐
States, changes in the behavior of monetary policy have anchored inflation expectations and 
altered the transmission of other shocks to activity and inflation significantly.  Finally, the 
overall importance of non-neoclassical, or credit-type, channels of monetary policy remains 
difficult to empirically assess with macroeconomic data and models, perhaps because the 
theoretical guidance for this type of macroeconomic empirical research has been limited; this 
area is likely to be a very active, and hopefully fertile, area of research in coming years.   We use 
our analysis to discuss directions for such research about the conduct of monetary policy in the 
aftermath of the current financial crisis. 
 
II. THE CHANNELS OF MONETARY TRANSMISSION 
 
Monetary transmission can be categorized into two basic types, neoclassical channels in which 
financial markets are perfect and non-neoclassical channels that involve financial market 
imperfections, which are usually referred to as the credit view. 
  In our discussion below, we will take as given that the monetary authority’s policy 
instrument, at least in normal times, involves direct control over a short-run interest rate (e.g., the 
federal funds rate in the United States).  We also assume that nominal wage and price rigidities 
imply that variations in the nominal policy interest rate affect the real interest rate directly.  Our 
discussion of the effects from policy settings to real activity hence focuses on how variation in   ‐6‐
the short-term nominal policy rate feeds through to the real interest rate and other asset prices, 
thereby influencing spending.  Table 1 provides a summary of the channels we discuss.
2 
  An important feature of many of the transmission mechanisms we discuss is that it is the 
real (rather than the nominal) interest rate that affects other asset prices and spending in (many) 
transmission channels.  In addition, the entire expected path of interest rates, not solely the 
current value, influences asset prices and spending.  Both of these factors give rise to an 
important role for expectations in the effects of monetary policy actions, as policy strategies can 
influence both the expected course of nominal interest rates and the outlook for inflation and 
hence real interest rates.
3  Indeed, Woodford (2003) suggests that the “management” of 
expectations is the primary responsibility of a monetary authority.  We discuss the important role 
of expectations at several points in our analysis; we also highlight channels in which nominal, 




The traditional channels of monetary policy transmission are built upon the core models of 
investment, consumption, and international trade behavior developed during the mid-20
th 
                                                            
2 Mishkin (1995) covers similar ground; Taylor (1995) emphasizes neoclassical channels; and Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) emphasize credit channels. 
3 That the real interest rate rather than the nominal rate affects spending provides an important mechanism for how 
monetary policy can stimulate the economy, even if nominal interest rates hit the zero lower bound as has happened 
during persistent deflationary episodes and as has occurred recently around the world.  With nominal interest rates at 
a floor of zero, a commitment to future expansionary monetary policy can lower long-term interest rates and raise 
expected inflation, thereby lowering real interest rates and stimulating spending (e.g., Eggertson and Woodford, 
2003).  For example, the Federal Reserve’s FOMC statements have indicated since 2009 that the federal funds rate 
would be kept at very low values for an extended period of time.   ‐7‐
century: The neoclassical models of investment of Jorgenson (1963) and Tobin (1969), the life-
cycle/permanent income models of consumption of Brumberg and Modigliani (1954), Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), and Friedman (1957), and the international IS/LM-type models of Mundell 
(1963) and Fleming (1962).  We categorize these primary channels using this framework, and 
hence distinguish by channels that directly affect investment, consumption, and international 
trade.  For investment, the key channels are the direct interest rate channel operating through the 
user cost of capital and the closely related Tobin’s q channel; for consumption, the channels 
operate through wealth effects and intertemporal substitution effects; and for trade, the direct 




Direct interest-rate channels.  The most traditional channel of monetary transmission that have 
been embedded in macroeconomic models involve the impact of interest rates on the cost of 
capital and hence on business and household investment spending (e.g., residential and consumer 
durables investment).  Standard neoclassical models of investment demonstrate that the user cost 
of capital is a key determinant of the demand for capital, whether it be investment goods, 
residential housing or consumer durables.
4 
 The user cost of capital (uc) can be written as:  
uc = pc [(1￿)i - 
e
c π + δ ] 
                                                            
4 The classic reference is Jorgenson (1963).   ‐8‐
where pc is the relative price of new capital, i is the nominal interest rate, 
e
c π is the expected rate 
of price appreciation of the capital asset, and δ is the depreciation rate.  The user cost formula 
also allows for the deductibility of the interest rate (which is particularly important in the United 
States where mortgage interest is deductable) by adjusting the nominal interest rate by the 
marginal tax rate τ .  Regrouping terms, the user cost of capital can be rewritten in terms of 
after-tax real interest rate, (1-τ )i - 
e π , and the expected real rate of appreciation of the capital 
asset, 
e
c π - 
e π , where is the expected inflation rate. 
e π . 
[{(1 ) } { }]
ee e
cc c up i τ ππ π =− − − −  
  Several factors are important in determining the effects of monetary policy operating 
through these direct, user-cost channels.  The first regards the horizon over which interest rates 
influence spending.  Because capital assets are long-lived and the adjustment of these stocks 
involves costs (of planning, procurement, installation, etc.), businesses and households take the 
long view when factoring variation in interest rates into their investment decisions.  As a result, 
the real interest rate and the expected real appreciation of the capital asset that influence 
spending will typically be related to the expected life of the asset, which is often very long.  In 
traditional econometric models, this link typically is formalized through direct inclusion of a 
long-term interest rate in the user cost formula, rather than a short-term interest rate.  In the 
recent generation of micro-founded models, often called dynamic-stochastic-general-equilibrium 
(DSGE) models, this link typically arises through a dynamic intertemporal optimality condition 
for investment that makes spending depend on the expected sequence of short-term interest rates 
going forward (as we will present below).     ‐9‐
  With the monetary policy instrument being a short-term interest rate, this discussion 
makes clear that the monetary transmission mechanism involves the link between short and long-
term interest rates through some version of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure.  
When monetary policy raises short-term interest rates, long-term interest rates also tend to rise 
because they are linked to future short-term rates; consequently the user cost of capital rises and 
the demand for the capital asset falls.  The decline in the demand for the capital asset leads to 
lower spending on investment in these assets and so causes aggregate spending and demand to 
decline.   
 
Tobin’s q. The investment decisions of firms and households can also be considered in the 
framework of James Tobin (1969).  For business investment, Tobin (1969) defined q as the 
market value of firms divided by the replacement cost of capital.  When q is high, the market 
price of firms is high relative to the replacement cost of capital, and new plant and equipment 
capital is cheap relative to the market value of firms.  Companies can then issue stock and get a 
high price for it relative to the cost of the facilities and equipment they are buying.  As a result, 
investment spending will rise, because firms can buy a lot of new investment goods with only a 
small issue of stock.  In principle, similar reasoning could be applied to household investment 
decisions. 
 Tobin’  q theory can be linked to the user cost of capital approach, as shown by, for 
example, Hayashi (1982).  Indeed, the q-formulation dominates formal micro-based modeling 
efforts and the DSGE literature mentioned previously, in large part because the formal links 
between q-theory and the user-cost approach in the dynamic adjustment cost approach of   ‐10‐
Hayashi (1982) allow for convenient analytical expressions in such models.  In addition, the q-
approach does add a degree of richness, as it emphasizes that there is a direct link between stock 
prices and investment spending.  In practice, Tobin’s q therefore leads to another channel of 
monetary transmission:   When monetary policy is eased and interest rates lowered, the demand 
for stocks increases and stock prices rise, thereby leading to increased investment spending and 
aggregate demand. 
 
Previous empirical literature on investment-based channels: The user cost channel described 
above is a standard feature of large scale macro-econometric models used for forecasting and 
policy analysis in the United States such as the MPS model developed in the 1970s (Brayton and 
Mauskopf, 1985) and the more recent FRB/US model used at the Federal Reserve (e.g., 
Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams, 1999).  It is also a standard feature in large scale macro-
econometric models developed at central banks for other countries: Examples include the ECB’s 
Area-Wide-Model (Fagan, Henry, and Mestre, 2005, and Bank of England’s Quarterly Model, 
Harrison et al, 2005).  The q-representation of this channel is the baseline model of investment 
decisions in DSGE models used at central banks (e.g., the EDO model of the Federal Reserve 
Board (Edge, Kiley, and Laforte, 2007, 2008, forthcoming and Kiley, 2009), the New Area Wide 
Model of the ECB (Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne), 2008, and ToTEM at the Bank of Canada 
(Murchison and Rennison, 2006)). 
  This channel of monetary policy transmission is an important one in these models – 
investment spending is the bulk of the near-term response to changes in the short-term policy 
rate.  This finding has long been true in models employed at central banks (e.g., see the   ‐11‐
comparison of central bank models reported in Smets, 1995).  Nonetheless, the long-run 
sensitivity of investment to changes in the user cost of capital is controversial, and the short-run 
elasticities can be estimated to be quite small in data for the United States and other countries – 
findings which have led some (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) to question the primacy of this 
channel.    For example, for residential housing using U.S. data, the long-run elasticities range 
from -0.2 to -1.0 (for example, Hanushek and Quigley, 1980; Case, 1986; Henderson and 
Ioannnides, 1986; McCarthy and Peach, 2002; and Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams, 1999); 
short-run elasticities, which may be more important for monetary policy questions, are modest 
(especially abstracting from regulation-induced credit market effects in the U.S. prior to the early 
1980s).    For business investment, the estimated range of elasticities is also considerable: 
Chirinko (1993) summarizes evidence for the U.S. and states that “the response of investment to 
price variables tends to be small and unimportant relative to quantity variables”; Fagan, Henry, 
and Mestre (2005) report for the Euro area elasticity after one year of less than .1 percent.  
Estimates for consumer durables are scant, but also tend to be small in the short-run; for 
example, the short-run semi-elasticity of consumer durables investment reported in Taylor 
(1993) lies close to zero. 
  The second term of the user cost of capital, the expected real rate of appreciation of the 
capital asset,  e
c π -  e π , provides an additional way for monetary policy to affect investment 
spending, whether it is by businesses or households.  Changes in these expectations can have an 
important effect on the user cost of capital and thus on spending, and this has been particularly 
emphasized for the housing market by Case and Shiller (2003).  When monetary policy tightens 
and interest rates rise, housing prices soften because the demand for housing declines through the 
user cost transmission mechanism described above.  Expectations of future tightening of   ‐12‐
monetary policy could therefore lower the expected real rate of appreciation of housing prices, 
thereby raising the current user cost of capital, which would then lead to a decline in the demand 




Wealth Effects.  Standard applications of the life-cycle hypothesis of saving and consumption, 
first developed by Brumberg and Modigliani (1954) and later augmented by Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), indicate that consumption spending is determined by the lifetime resources of 
consumers, which includes wealth, whether from stock, real estate or other assets.  Expansionary 
monetary policy in the form of lower short-term interest rates will stimulate the demand for 
assets such as common stocks and housing, thereby driving up their prices; alternatively (and 
equivalently), lower interest rates lower the discount rate applied to the income and service flows 
associated with stocks, homes, and other assets, driving up their price.  The resulting increase in 
total wealth will then stimulate household consumption and aggregate demand.  Standard life-
cycle wealth effects operating through asset prices are thus an important element in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
 
Intertemporal Substitution Effects.  A second consumption-based channel reflects intertemporal 
substitution effects.  Indeed, this channel is central to the models in the DSGE tradition 
mentioned earlier.  In this channel, changes in short-term interest rates alter the slope of the   ‐13‐
consumption profile, so that lower interest rates induce higher consumption today.  In DSGE 
models, this channel naturally arises through the models’ use of the standard consumption Euler 
equation linking the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption with 
the real interest rate.   
 
Previous empirical literature on consumption-based channels: The wealth effect has had a 
prominent role in macro-econometric models, such as the ones used at the Federal Reserve for 
policy analysis.  This view is embedded in the macroeconometric models used at the Federal 
Reserve Board and elsewhere, in which the long-run marginal propensity to consume out of 
wealth in the United States is currently estimated to be between 3 and 4 cents per dollar, for both 
housing wealth and stock market wealth; Fair (2004) reports a wealth effect of similar size for 
the United States.
 5,6  Catte and others (2004), in a study of OECD countries, find that the long-
run marginal propensity to consume out of financial wealth ranges from 0.01 in Italy to 0.07 
percent in Japan; their estimate of the OECD average is about 0.035, and their estimate for the 
United States is 0.03.  With that said, the short-run wealth effects are even smaller, and monetary 
policy can only influence wealth in the short-run; as a result, the wealth effect has played an 
                                                            
5 The life-cycle view that wealth effects are the same for all types of wealth is controversial, with some research 
indicating that housing wealth has a greater effect on consumption than non-housing wealth, with other research 
finding the opposite.  For a survey of this literature, see Mishkin (2007). 
 
6 An overview of the monetary transmission mechanism in the FRB/US model is in Reifschneider, Tetlow, and 
Williams (1999).  The wealth effects estimated by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board have varied importantly 
over time.  As discussed in Brayton and Mauskopf (1985), in the MPS model (the predecessor to FRB/US), the 
propensity to spend real estate wealth ranged from an estimate in the 1970s of 2.9 cents per dollar to an estimate in 
the 1980s of 8.4 cents.  The source of that variation appears to have been a lack of variation in the ratio of real estate 
wealth to aggregate income.  In contrast, historical fluctuations in stock market wealth have been sufficient to allow 
a more precise estimation of the propensity to spend that wealth; the Board staff’s estimates of this propensity have 
stayed within a narrow range of 3 cents to 4 cents per dollar for the past forty years.   ‐14‐
important role in modeling efforts, but has played a secondary role to direct interest rate channels 
of investment in most modeling efforts (e.g., the summary of central bank models in Smets, 
1995).
7 
The intertemporal-substitution channel is also typically modest in the short run – as the 
sensitivity of the slope of the consumption profile to short-term interest rates is typically 
estimated to be small, mainly through the inclusion of habit persistence (e.g., Smets and 
Wouters, 2007, or Edge, Kiley, and Laforte, 2007, or Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne, 2008).  
This finding is directly related to a large empirical literature: Hall (1988) and subsequent 
research have tended to uniformly suggest modest intertemporal substitution.    For this reason, it 
is perhaps not surprising that econometric models discussed in the previous paragraph have 
typically not emphasized this channel – for example, this channel of monetary transmission has 
not been a factor in the Federal Reserve’s MPS or FRB/US models and was not included in the 
ECB’s Area Wide Model (e.g., Fagan, Henry, and Mestre, 2005). 
 
International-trade based channels 
 
Exchange Rate Channel.  When the central bank lowers interest rates, the return on domestic 
assets falls relative to foreign assets.  As a result, the value of domestic assets relative to other 
currency assets falls, and the domestic currency depreciates.  The lower value of the domestic 
currency makes domestic goods cheaper than foreign goods, thereby leading to expenditure 
                                                            
4 Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) emphasize the difference between short-run and long-run movements in wealth and 
movements in consumption, albeit not in the context of the monetary transmission mechanism per se.   ‐15‐
switching and a rise in net exports.  The rise in net exports then adds directly to aggregate 
demand.  Therefore, the exchange rate channel plays an important role in how monetary policy 
affects the economy.  In this regard, two factors are important.  First, the sensitivity of the 
exchange rate to interest rate movements is important: For example, it was not uncommon on 
earlier, econometric models for the estimated sensitivities to be small, implying a small channel; 
whereas models that impose uncovered interest parity tend to find a larger role for this channel.  
Second, smaller, more open economies tend to see larger effects through this channel.
8 
 
Non-neoclassical Channels: The Credit View 
 
We call channels that arise because of market imperfections (other than those associated with 
nominal wage and price rigidities) non-neoclassical transmission mechanisms.  Such channels 
can arise  either from  government interference in markets or through imperfections in private 
markets, such as asymmetric information or market segmentation that lead to barriers to efficient 
financial markets functioning.  In general, these non-neoclassical transmission mechanisms 
involve market imperfections in credit markets and so have been given the name the “credit 
view”.  There are three basic non-neoclassical channels that we discuss here: effects on credit 
supply from government interventions in credit markets, the bank-based channels (through 
lending and bank capital), and the balance-sheet channel (affecting both firms and households). 
 
                                                            
8 For examples, see Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993), Taylor (1993), and Smets (1995)   ‐16‐
Effects on Credit Supply from Government Interventions in Credit Markets.  Governments often 
interfere with the free functioning of credit markets in order to achieve certain policy objectives 
such as redistribution or encouraging particular types of investment.  In the United States, 
government intervention has been particularly important in housing finance in order to encourage 
home ownership.  
  Up until the 1980s, the U.S. government had set up a system in which thrift institutions, 
particularly savings and loan associations, were the primary issuers of residential mortgages.  As 
a result of regulatory constraints, these institutions primarily made long-term, fixed-rate 
mortgage loans in their local areas using funds provided by local time deposits (see, for example, 
McCarthy and Peach, 2002).  Government regulation also were geared to helping these thrifts 
attract deposit funding, enabling them to make more mortgage loans, by establishing ceilings on 
the interest rates on deposits under Regulation Q, and allowing thrifts to pay 25 basis points 
(0.25 percentage points) more on their deposits than commercial banks. 
  The regulatory requirements that thrifts issue long-term mortgages and Regulation Q 
ceilings led to an important channel of monetary transmission involving credit supply.  When the 
Federal Reserve tightened policy and raised interest rates there were two effects that led to a 
decline in the supply of credit to the mortgage market.  First higher short-term rates would 
increase the cost of funds for the thrifts, while income from fixed-rate mortgages is slow to 
change, thereby leading to a contraction in net interest income.  The resulting weakening of 
thrifts balance sheets would then result in a decreased willingness to issue mortgages, thus 
causing a contraction in credit supply.    ‐17‐
  Even more importantly, higher short-term rates would often lead to rates that were higher 
than the deposit rate ceilings, thereby causing depositors to withdraw their funds from thrifts and 
commercial banks in order to put them into higher yielding securities.  This loss of deposits from 
the banking system, a process called “disintermediation”, restricted the amount of funds that 
banks and thrifts could lend and therefore would cause a sharp contraction in mortgage credit 
and hence in residential construction activity. 
  The credit rationing channel described here indeed was important in macro-econometric 
models pre-1980 (e.g., the description of the MPS model in Brayton and Mauskopf, 1985), 
although their effects partly operated through the timing, rather than overall magnitude, of the 
impact of monetary policy actions on spending  Starting in the early 1980s, the Regulation Q 
deposit rate ceilings were gradually eliminated, with complete abandonment by 1986,  and so 
disintermediation from this government intervention in credit markets is no longer an important 
channel of monetary transmission.  
 
Bank-based Channels.  There are two distinct bank-based transmission channels.  In both, banks 
play a special role in the transmission process because bank loans are imperfect substitutes for 
other funding sources. 
The first is the traditional bank lending channel.  According to this view, banks play a 
special role in the financial system because they are especially well suited to solve asymmetric 
information problems in credit markets.  Because of banks’ special role, certain borrowers will 
not have access to credit markets unless they borrow from banks.    As long as there is no perfect 
substitutability of retail bank deposits with other sources of funds, the bank lending channel   ‐18‐
operates as follows.  Expansionary monetary policy, which increases bank reserves and bank 
deposits, increases the quantity of bank loans available.  Because many borrowers are dependent 
on bank loans to finance their activities, this increase in loans will cause investment and 
consumer spending to rise.
9 
  An important implication of the bank lending channel is that monetary policy will have a 
greater effect on expenditure by smaller firms, which are more dependent on bank loans, than it 
will on large firms, which can get funds directly through stock and bond markets (and not only 
through banks.)  Though the bank lending channel has been supported in empirical work (e.g., 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993, 1994, Kashyap and Stein, 1995, Peek and Rosengren, 1995a, 1995b, 
1997), other research has raised doubts about the bank lending channel (see Romer and Romer, 
1989, and Ramey, 1993).  Lown and Morgan (2002) report results that suggest that bank lending 
may have an important role in macroeconomic fluctuations, but also find that the bank lending 
channel for monetary policy changes may be quite small.  Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) present 
results that suggest the presence of a bank-lending channel for households in countries where 
mortgage finance is more bank dependent.  Overall, the literature on the bank lending channel 
has focused on evidence showing its potential importance, but little work has been developed to 
provide an overall assessment of the macroeconomic importance of this channel, rather than its 
importance for certain classes of firms or banks, or for certain episodes. 
  A separate bank channel is called the bank capital channel.  In this channel, the state of 
banks’ and other financial intermediaries’ balance sheets has an important impact on lending.  A 
fall in asset prices can lead to losses in banks’ loan portfolios; alternatively, a decline in credit 
                                                            
9 For surveys of the literature on the bank lending channel, see Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Peek and 
Rosengren (1995b).   ‐19‐
quality, because borrowers are less able or willing to pay back their loans, may also reduce the 
value of bank assets.  The resulting losses in bank assets can result in a diminution of bank 
capital, as has occurred during the recent financial crisis.  The shortage of bank capital can then 
lead to a cutback in the supply of bank credit, as external financing for banks can be costly, 
particularly during a period of declining asset prices, implying that the most cost-effective way 
for banks to increase their capital to asset ratio is to shrink their asset base by cutting back on 
lending.  This “deleveraging” process means that bank-dependent borrowers are now no longer 
able to get credit and so they will cut back their spending and aggregate demand will fall.
10 
Expansionary monetary policy can lead to improved bank balance sheets in two ways.  
First, lower short-term interest rates tend to increase net interest margins and so lead to higher 
bank profits which result in an improvement in bank balance sheets over time.   Second, 
expansionary monetary policy can raise asset prices and lead to immediate increases in bank 
capital.   In the bank capital channel, expansionary monetary policy boosts bank capital, lending, 
and hence aggregate demand by enabling bank-dependent borrowers to spend more. 
  The bank lending and bank capital channels have typically not been built into either large 
scale macro-econometric models or DSGE models used in policy analysis.  Despite this, 
awareness of the bank lending and bank capital channels has played an important role in the 
conduct of monetary policy in recent years.  This was true in the early 1990s, when Alan 
Greenspan talked about “headwinds” in the economy as a result of the deterioration in bank 
balance sheets (see, for example, the discussion of credit channels and the MPS model in 
Mauskopf, 1990, and the description of the early 1990s in Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox, 
1997). While research documenting the policy process recently remains a future topic, the 
                                                            
10 See Van den Heuvel (2002) and Peek and Rosengren (2010.   ‐20‐
importance of these channels in the recent crisis has been emphasized by policymakers and 
popular accounts (e.g., Mishkin, 2008, and Wessel, 2009).  Moreover, research is now focused 
explicitly on incorporating such channels in mainstream models used in policy analysis (e.g., 
Meh and Moran, 2008, Angeloni and Faia, 2009, Gerali et al, 2009, and Gertler and Kiyotaki, 
2010). 
 
Balance Sheet Channel.  Like the bank lending channel, the balance sheet channel arises from 
the presence of asymmetric information problems in credit markets.  When an agent’s net worth 
falls, adverse selection and moral hazard problems increase in credit markets.  Lower net worth 
means that the agent has less collateral, thereby increasing adverse selection and increasing the 
incentive to boost risk-taking, thus exacerbating the moral hazard problem.   As a result, lenders 
will be more reluctant to make loans (either by demanding higher risk premia or curtailing the 
quantity lent), leading to a decline in spending and aggregate demand.  A particularly 
convenient, and widely adopted, model of this type is he financial accelerator framework of 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), in which lower net 
worth increases the problems associated with asymmetric information in debt financing, thereby 
increasing the external finance premium. 
  Monetary policy affects firms’ balance sheets in several ways.  As we have seen, 
contractionary monetary policy leads to a decline in asset prices, particularly equity prices, 
which lowers the net worth of firms.  Contractionary monetary policy therefore causes adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems to worsen, which leads to a decline in lending, spending 
and aggregate demand.  Another way that monetary policy can affect firms’ balance sheets is   ‐21‐
through cash flow, the difference between cash receipts and cash expenditure.  Contractionary 
monetary policy, which raises interest rates, causes firms’ interest payments to rise, thereby 
causing cash flow to fall.  With less cash flow, the firm has fewer internal funds and must raise 
funds externally.  Because external funding is subject to asymmetric information problems and 
hence an external finance premium, additional reliance on external funds boosts the cost of 
capital, curtailing lending, investment and economic activity.  An interesting feature of the cash 
flow channel is that nominal interest rates affect firms’ cash flow, in contrast to the role of the 
real interest rate emphasized in neoclassical channels.  Furthermore, the short-term interest rate 
plays a special role in this transmission mechanism, because interest payments on short-term 
(rather than long-term) debt typically have the greatest impact on firms’ cash flow. Different 
variants of the balance sheet channel have been recently considered in investigating optimal 
monetary policy in the presence of credit frictions.  Examples include Curdia and Woodford 
(2009) and Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian (2009). 
These types of balance sheet channels also affect households.  For example, an increase 
in house prices leads to more potential collateral for the homeowner, which may improve both 
the amount and terms of credit available to these households.  In other words, higher house 
prices can reduce the external finance premium or relax constraints on the quantity of credit 
available to a household.  In principle, other assets affecting household net worth could similarly 
affect the cost of external funds or quantity of credit available to households.  A number of 
empirical studies have suggested that changes in home values have had important effects on 
households’ access to credit and spending (Hatzius, 2005, and Benito and others, 2006).  Some 
modeling efforts, and associated empirical work, have also found support for financial 
accelerator mechanisms related to housing and household expenditures (e.g., Iacoviello, 2005   ‐22‐
and Iacoviello and Neri, forthcoming).  The importance of rising house prices in relaxing credit 
constraints and stimulating consumer spending is clearly dependent on how costly it is to 
withdraw housing equity and thus on the efficiency of mortgage markets that enable 
homeowners to overcome credit constraints.  In countries with better-developed mortgage 
markets, consumer spending may therefore be more sensitive to increases in house prices.
11  
Indeed, Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca (2007) find that the correlation of consumption growth 
with changes in house prices is higher in economies with more-developed mortgage finance 
systems; Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) present evidence that the balance sheet channel affecting 
households is stronger in countries with less developed mortgage finance systems.
12 
 




11 Major differences exist across mortgage markets in advanced industrial countries (Calza, Monacelli, and Stracca, 
2007).  Mortgage markets in the United States are considered to be among the most developed; in some other 
countries, mortgage lending is hobbled by relatively weak bankruptcy laws and difficulties in seizing collateral.  In 
Italy, for example, where procedures to repossess collateral are lengthy and expensive, the average loan-to-value 
ratio on mortgages is relatively low (50 percent, versus 70 percent for the United States), and the ratio of mortgage 
debt to GDP is likewise low (15 percent, versus 70 percent for the United States). 
12 Another way of looking at how the balance sheet channel may affect consumer spending is through liquidity 
effects on consumer durable and housing expenditure which have been found to be an important factor affecting 
aggregate demand during the Great Depression (Mishkin, 1978).  In the liquidity effects view, balance sheet effects 
work through their impact on the consumers’ desire to spend rather than on lenders’ desire to lend.  Because of 
asymmetric information about their quality, consumer durables and housing are very illiquid assets (Mishkin, 1976).  
If as a result of a bad income shock, consumers need to sell their consumer durables or housing to raise money, they 
would expect a big loss because they would not get the full value of these assets in a distress sale.  (This is the 
manifestation of the lemons problem described by Akerlof, 1970.)  In contrast, if consumers expect a higher 
likelihood of finding themselves in financial distress, they would rather hold fewer illiquid consumer durable or 
housing assets and more liquid financial assets.  When consumers have a large amount of financial assets relative to 
their debts, their estimate of the probability of financial distress is low, and they will be more willing to purchase 
consumer durables or housing.   Expansionary monetary policy boosts the value of financial assets; consumer 
durable expenditure and housing purchases then rise because consumers have a more secure financial position and a 
lower estimate of suffering financial distress.  Liquidity effects therefore lead to another household balance sheet 
channel for monetary transmission.   ‐23‐
The survey of the different channels of monetary transmission provides two primary reasons why 
the monetary transmission mechanism may have changed over time: structural changes in the 
economy, particularly credit markets, and the interaction between changes in monetary policy 
actions and the way expectations are formed.
13 
 
Institutional Changes in Credit Markets 
 
Changes in the institutional structure of credit markets have the potential to alter the 
monetary transmission mechanism, particularly by affecting market imperfections that are the 
source of the non-neoclassical channels.   
One major change in credit markets over the years was the removal in the 1980s of many 
of the restrictive regulations which limited thrifts to making long-term fixed-rate mortgages and 
limited the interest rate that financial institutions could pay on their deposits with deposit rate 
ceilings.  The result of this financial liberalization is that the disintermediation process in which 
higher interest rates led to a reduced supply of mortgages from thrift institutions is no longer 
operational.  Large swings in credit supply in the mortgage market resulting from an increase in 
interest rates that limited the ability of mortgage-issuing institutions to acquire funds are thus no 
                                                            
13 One potentially important factor affecting monetary transmission arises from the increased pace of globalization 
and consequent increased openness of the U.S. and other economies.  With traded goods becoming a more important 
sector of the economy, exchange rate movements have the potential to have a larger effect on aggregate spending.   
Hence the exchange rate channel of monetary transmission may have become more important over time.  Such 
changes are likely even more important for small economies.  However, these are likely less important for the 
United States, despite the increased importance of trade, because the net effect on aggregate demand from 
international trade following a monetary policy innovation tends to be close to zero, as the exchange-rate induced 
movements in exports tend to be offset, on net, by shifts in imports related to the accompanying changes in domestic 
demand.  For this reason, we do not focus on this channel much in our subsequent empirical work.   ‐24‐
longer a feature of the economy.  Since this channel of monetary policy transmission was 
important prior to 1980, its absence currently would weaken the impact of monetary policy on 
residential construction.    
In addition, the growth of securitization in the mortgage market also has weakened credit 
supply effects in the mortgage market and has tightened the link between market interest rates 
and interest rates on residential mortgages.  As shown in Table 2, banks provided most home 
mortgage credit in the 1966-1970 period; however, the GSEs (and securitization) grew 
increasingly important over the next two decades, funding a nearly equal share of home 
mortgage credit by 1986-1990; and GSEs came to dominate such credit provision over the 2004-
2008 period, with other sources accounting for a share similar to that of banks.   
In the pre-1980s period, residential construction fell very quickly in response to tighter 
monetary policy, while mortgage rates responded gradually.  In contrast, after the 1980s, 
mortgage rates respond more quickly and persistently to changes in monetary policy.  As a 
result, monetary policy now primarily affects housing through pricing channels rather than 
through credit supply restrictions, as was the case before 1980 (Mauskopf, 1990; McCarthy and 
Peach, 2002).  This means that the response of residential construction is more delayed than in 
earlier periods and is smaller initially.  However, these changes are to a significant degree shifts 
only in the short-run timing of responses. 
  The second major change in the credit markets is that improvements in information 
technology have improved the efficiency of credit markets, allowing a wider set of institutions to 
become engaged in extending credit. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the growth of 
securitization, the transformation of otherwise illiquid financial assets (such as residential   ‐25‐
mortgages, auto loan, small business loans and credit card receivables), which have typically 
been the bread and butter of banking institutions, into marketable securities.  Securitization has 
led to the enormous expansion of the so-called “shadow banking system,” in which bank lending 
has been replaced by lending via the securities market.  The growth of the shadow banking 
system has had two enormous impacts.  First it has enabled borrowers to bypass banks to get 
credit.  The result has been a shrinking share of credit that is provided by banks.  Second is that 
the shadow banking system has led, at least until the recent financial crisis, to wider access to 
credit by a larger percentage of the population, which is sometimes referred to as the 
“democratization of credit.” 
  The first impact, which indicates that the banking system is playing a smaller role in 
credit markets, suggests that the bank lending and bank capital channels may be less important 
than they were previously.  However, the relative strength of these channels, at least in typical 
times, has always been a subject of controversy (as discussed earlier), and hence there is little 
evidence documenting variation over time in the importance of this channel; for example, Miron, 
Romer, and Weil (1994) examine a long span of U.S. history and find little evidence that the 
changing nature of financial markets has affected the importance of the bank lending channel, in 
part because they find very limited evidence for such a channel.   However, we have recently 
seen a substantial shrinkage in the shadow banking system as a result of the recent financial 
crisis; it is certainly possible, and perhaps probable, that the bank lending and bank capital 
channels may become more important than they have been in recent years.   
  The second impact, the democratization of credit, has led to much easier access to credit.  
For example, in the United States, down-payment requirements have been falling, along with 
refinancing costs, and the use of credit scoring has widened access to housing and other loans   ‐26‐
(e.g., Edelberg, 2006).   These developments may have increased the role of balance sheet 
channels for households, perhaps increasing the responsiveness of consumer spending to changes 
in house prices (for example, Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe, 2002).  But a greater balance sheet 
channel could be offset by other impacts of increased access to credit.  For example, better 
household access to credit could lower the sensitivity of consumer spending to transitory income 
shocks – as suggested by Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006), who find evidence that the 
sensitivity of consumption to transitory income shocks has fallen in the United States since the 
mid-1980s.  Support for that view also comes from microeconomic evidence that households use 
mortgage refinancing to buffer their spending from income shocks (Hurst and Stafford, 2004) 
and that the propensity to refinance mortgages has increased as a result of structural changes in 
the mortgage market, such as the development of credit scoring (Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani, 
2001).  Such a decreased sensitivity to transitory income shocks could reduce the responsiveness 
of spending to monetary policy shifts indirectly by altering the impact on consumption of 
income.  
 
Changes in the Way Expectations Are Formed 
 
While we have only touched on expectations in our survey so far, one of the most important 
shifts in the practice of monetary policy, and hence potentially in its transmission to activity and 
inflation, is the manner in which the “management of expectations” has become an important 
tool of monetary authorities throughout the world.  Shifts in the behavior of the monetary 
authority can affect the transmission mechanism importantly.  These effects have two forms,   ‐27‐
both of which are likely to be quantitatively important.  First, expenditures depend directly on 
the expected path of policy rates through the influence of this path on asset prices; for example, 
if a rise in the policy rate is expected to be more persistent, the expectations hypothesis of the 
term structure indicates that the impact on long-term interest rates will be larger than if it is 
expected to be temporary.  Second, the nature of the policy rule can have important feedback 
effects through its influence on expected spending and inflation; for example, policy behavior 
that responds strongly to deviations of output from potential and deviations of inflation from 
desired levels will lead to greater stability in expectations for income and inflation, and hence 
greater stability in actual spending and inflation.  Indeed, some research has emphasized the 
potential importance of changes in policy behavior of this type in shifts in the aggregate impact 
of monetary policy actions (e.g., Boivin and Giannoni, 2006).  We will examine the potential 
evidence for such changes in some detail in section V.   
  While the potential importance of the expectations channel is especially apparent in 
simple New-Keynesian models (e.g., Woodford, 2003) and their DSGE descendents, the 
potential for large quantitative effects is not confined to this class of models.  For example, the 
approach in Taylor (1993), which emphasizes expectations channels but is less strictly tied to 
specific microeconomic optimization problems, also allows for potentially powerful effects.  
And the reduced-form expectations approach followed in the most commonly-used version of the 
FRB/US model (based on small vector-autoregressive systems for expectations formation) also 
allows for potentially large effects; indeed, Reifschneider, Tetlow, and Williams (1999) report 
that more than ½ of the effect of monetary policy on activity over the first year of a change in the 
federal funds rate reflects the expectations channel, rather than direct interest rate, wealth, or 
exchange rate channels.   ‐28‐
 
IV. HAS THE EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY ON THE ECONOMY CHANGED? 
AGGREGATE EVIDENCE 
 
As discussed in the previous section, there are potentially many developments that could have 
implied a change in the way monetary policy transmits to the economy. But before investigating 
the causes, the first set of questions to investigate is whether the effect monetary policy on the 
economy – in particular real activity, prices and their key components – has changed in a 
meaningful way over time and how. In this section we review the existing results on this 
question and provide some new evidence. 
 
Modeling the Monetary Transmission Mechanism 
 
One crude and simple way to measure the effect of monetary policy on a variable of 
interest is to regress this variable on the monetary policy instrument as well as, perhaps, 
additional control variables. The estimated coefficient on the policy instrument is interpreted as 
the sensitivity of that variable to monetary policy and changes in this sensitivity as suggestive of 
a change in the transmission of monetary policy. However, since, in the context of such 
regressions, exogenous sources of policy changes are not clearly isolated and causality is not 
well established, these are not the only potential interpretations. For instance, the estimated 
coefficients might instead be capturing the response of monetary policy to these variables, rather   ‐29‐
than the opposite, as intended; indeed, we highlighted the pitfalls of reasoning from such 
reduced-form correlations in our presentation of the shifts in raw correlations in the first 
section.
14   
To be able to go beyond this reduced form evidence and establish a causal link, the main 
general strategy used in the literature consists of using what is believed to be an exogenous 
source of variation in the monetary policy instrument and tracing out its effect on key variables 
capturing the aggregate behavior of the economy. This is typically achieved in the context of a 
system of equation where just enough restrictions are imposed to identify the exogenous source 
of variations in monetary policy, but that is otherwise left free of a priori assumptions on the 
structure of the economy. This has the virtue of providing robust estimates of the effect of 
monetary policy, in the sense that they are consistent with a large class of linear structural 
models. However, that also means that while these models are useful to document the effect of 
monetary policy on the economy, their use in determining the cause of the change, a question we 
take up in the next section, is more limited. 
The class of empirical models considered in the literature, and that we discuss below, can 
all be seen as special cases of a general factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) 
                                                            
14 A variant of this reduced-form approach has examined the evolution of the transmission of monetary on 
disaggregated categories of expenditures; these studies typically involve either regressions of the expenditure 
category of interest on the short-term policy rate or on oher interest rates, with auxiliary reduced-form equations 
specified to link these other interest rates to the short-term policy rate.  They generally find a reduced interest 
sensitivity of residential investment (e.g., Friedman, 1989; Mauskopf, 1990; and Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel, 
2006). These studies uniformly attribute this shift to financial deregulation and financial innovations. Results for 
other expenditure categories are ambiguous. For consumption, Friedman (1989) reports lower interest sensitivity, 
while Akhtar and Harris (1987) and Mauskopf (1990) report no change. For nonresidential investment, Mauskopf 
(1990) reports lower interest sensitivity, Akhtar and Harris (1987) report no change, and Friedman (1989) reports 
some increase in sensitivity. Overall, we are hesitant to place too much weight on these studies given their reduced-
form approach.  Nonetheless, we read these studies, and others, as somewhat ambiguous, with perhaps moderate 
evidence of reduced interest sensitivity in the aggregate, most likely reflecting the regulatory and other changes in 
mortgage finance that have eliminated the credit restrictions associated with disintermediation following interest rate 
increases in the period prior to the 1980s.   ‐30‐
model.
15 It is thus useful to start by first introducing this general class of empirical models. In its 
general form, FAVAR has the following state-space representation:  
(1)        Λ        
(2)                      
where    denotes a potentially long vector of observed macroeconomic indicators of interest,    
is a vector of potentially unobserved variables governing the co-movements of the observable 
macroeconomic variables,    is a variable specific observational error and finally    are 
innovations that are linear combinations of the structural macroeconomic shocks, one of which is 
the monetary policy shock. Equation (1) states that observable macroeconomic indicators are 
potentially imperfect measures of the latent macroeconomic forces. Equation (2) states that the 
evolution of the co-movements among the macroeconomic indicators is governed by a set of 
common factors,   , that follow a vector autoregression (VAR). 
This empirical setup is appealing because it is consistent with a large class of linear 
rational expectation structural models and can accommodate various assumptions about the 
information set available to the agents, the monetary authority or the econometrician.
16 By far, 
the most common approach in the literature we survey below is to assume that the set of relevant 
fundamental macroeconomic concepts, such as real activity, inflation and interest rate, is 
perfectly observed by the econometrician. In that case, equation (1) boils down to a set of 
identities,     is observed, and the system (1) – (2) collapses to equation (2), which becomes a 
standard VAR in terms of observable macroeconomic indicators. All the VARs that have been 
                                                            
15 See Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005). 
16 See Boivin and Giannoni (2008) for an illustration.   ‐31‐
used to investigate the effect of monetary policy can thus be seen as a special case of system (1) 
– (2). They differ by the macroeconomic indicators they choose to include in   . 
Uncovering the monetary transmission mechanism within this empirical framework 
requires imposing restrictions to identify a structural shock corresponding to an exogenous 
change in monetary policy from   . In the special case of VARs, these restrictions often amount 
in practice to restrictions on the contemporaneous responses among the variables   . Given an 
identification scheme, the effect of the monetary policy on the variables in a standard VAR 
consists of computing from the estimated model the dynamic effect of an identified monetary 
policy shock. This can be computed for any variables included in a VAR. 
The standard VAR approach assumes that the dynamics of the macroeconomy can 
effectively be summarized by a handful of observable macroeconomic indicators. One reason 
why this might be unrealistic is that the true concepts of interest, such as real activity and 
inflation, might not be perfectly measured by any observable macroeconomic indicators. In that 
case, wrongly asserting that a specific measure correspond to a particular theoretical concepts 
might lead to biased estimates of the effect of monetary policy. Proper estimation would require 
recognizing the presence of such observational errors and once this is recognized, a potentially 
large set of macroeconomic indicators could conceivably carry useful information about the true 
state of the economy. This is why Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz (2005) proposed the more general 
FAVAR framework characterized by equations (1) – (2). 
While retaining the flavor of the VAR, the general FAVAR framework allows relaxing 
the assumptions that the relevant theoretical concepts of interest are known and perfectly 
observed by the econometricians. Instead, it treats observable variables as noisy indicators of the   ‐32‐
true but unobservable state of the economy. The same (typically recursive) identification scheme 
used in the standard VAR framework can be implemented in FAVAR. Moreover, by expanding 
the size of   , the universe of potentially useful information can be exploited, and the dynamic 




A change in the transmission of monetary policy means that some of the parameters of 
system (1) – (2) have changed over time, which, from a reduced-form perspective, could 
manifest itself by a change in the correlation of the policy instrument and the variable of interest. 
To evaluate the existence and the importance of changes in this transmission mechanism, 
existing studies have used one of the following three strategies: 1) Estimate an empirical model 
over different subsamples; 2) estimate an empirical model treating (some subsets of) the 
parameters as time-varying latent processes (typically assumed to evolve according to random 
walk); or 3) estimate a regime switching version of an empirical model where (some subset of) 
the parameters can stochastically switch between different, regime-dependent, values. 
Boivin and Giannoni (2002 and 2006), estimate a VAR over two samples corresponding 
to the pre- and post-Volcker periods (pre- and post-1979:4) and identify the monetary policy 
shock using a recursive identification scheme. They find that exogenous changes in monetary 
policy have had a smaller effect in the post Volcker period: for instance, they report that the 
through response of output in the post-1979:4 period is about a quarter of that in the previous 
period. Primiceri (2005), Galí and Gambetti (2009) and Canova and Gambetti (2009) use time-  ‐33‐
varying VARs with random walk coefficients to allow for a much richer evolution of the 
transmission of monetary policy.  Galí and Gambetti (2009) also find that the effect of demand-
type shocks on real activity and inflation has fallen over time, although they do not separate out 
the effect of policy shock per se. On the other hand, Primiceri (2005), based on a recursively 
identified VAR, reports little change in the transmission of monetary policy over the last fifty 
years. A similar conclusion is reached by Canova and Gambetti (2009) using a similar strategy 
except that monetary policy shocks are identified through sign restrictions. However, they also 
find that over the last decade, real activity has become more responsive to monetary policy 
shocks on impact. 
A careful look at the relationship between the strategy adopted and the results obtained 
provides some clues that are useful to sort out this conflicting evidence. For instance, the results 
of Canova and Gambetti (2009) that real activity has become more responsive to monetary 
policy shock post-1990 is in sharp contrast to the results of Boivin and Giannoni (2002 and 
2006), who find the opposite for the post-1980 period. Part of the explanation might be due to 
the fact that the evolution of the monetary policy transmission is more complex than what can be 
captured by the split sample estimation strategy, with a single break date, as assumed in Boivin 
and Giannoni (2002, 2006).  Clearly, the way the monetary policy shock is identified also plays a 
role. For instance, Canova and Gambetti (2009) find that the main change in the effect of 
monetary policy is on impact, yet, this impact effect is constrained to be zero under the 
identification scheme of Boivin and Giannoni (2002 and 2006). It is important to note however 
that Canova and Gambetti (2009) can leave the impact response of real activity at the cost of 
only obtaining partial identification. That is, since the sign restrictions they use only produces set 
identification, the impulse response functions they are reporting are in general not to a pure   ‐34‐
policy shock, but to some combination of structural shocks that include the policy shock.  
Finally, these studies use empirical models based on a handful of macroeconomic variables.  The 
omitted information can in principle explain why the conclusions are not robust to the way time-
variation is modeled or the policy shock is identified. 
However, we would highlight a couple of studies that helps shed light on these issues and 
will be related to our findings – the studies of Galí, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2003) and Galí 
and Gambetti (2009).  The latter study uses a structural VAR approach and finds smaller effects 
of “demand” shocks on activity in the post-1980 period, similar to the findings of Boivin and 
Giannoni (2002, 2006) for policy shocks.  Both studies also find evidence of a larger effect on 
output (and hours, where larger implies a smaller fall in hours) to innovations in productivity.  
We will find very similar results in our structural DSGE approach, and our findings are driven 
entirely by changes in monetary policy behavior and the effect of such changes on the 




Given that the literature is ambiguous about the importance of the changes in the 
transmission of monetary policy to the aggregate economy, it useful to revisit this question 
empirically in the context of the FAVAR framework.   
 
New FAVAR-based evidence. As mentioned earlier, one potential worry with the VAR-based 
evidence is that it could be contaminated by the omission of some important variables from the   ‐35‐
analysis. The solution that would consist of simply adding more variables to the VAR becomes 
quickly impractical, especially when we are looking for the presence of changes in recent history 
which requires the use of short time series. One way to potentially address these issues is to 
identify the effect of monetary policy within the more general FAVAR framework where the 
information from literally hundreds of macroeconomic indicators can be exploited. To our 
knowledge, the evolution of the monetary transmission mechanism has not been systematically 
investigated through the lens of such framework. 
The FAVAR we consider is based on a data set comprised a total of 181 macroeconomic 
indicators, of 182 variables of both at the quarterly (58) – a subset of which are the quarterly 
variables used in the previous VAR analysis –124) and at the monthly (58) frequencies (123). 
These include mainly real activity, price and interest rate measures, but also exchange rates, 
stock prices, and money and credit aggregates. The analysis is carried out at the monthly 
frequency. In the benchmark specification we use, there are 5 factors and 3 lags. The 
identification of monetary policy is the FAVAR equivalent of the recursive identification used in 
previous VAR analyses; that is, monetary policy is assumed to respond contemporaneously to 
real GDP, the PCE deflator and the unemployment rate, but none of these variables can respond 
to monetary policy within the period.
17 The contemporaneous response of all other variables is 
left unrestricted. We estimate the model over two subsamples: 1962:1 – 1979:9 and 1984:1 – 
2008:12.  
The impulse responses of real GDP, the PCE deflator and the Fed funds rate to a 
monetary policy shock are reported in Figure 2. Confidence intervals on the post-1984 estimate 
                                                            
17 See Stock and Watson (2005) for a complete discussion of alternative identification strategies, and their 
implementation, in a FAVAR context.   ‐36‐
of the impulse response functions are also reported. The results suggest that the magnitude of to 
responses of real GDP was greater in the pre-1979Q3 than in the post-1984Q1 period, but the 
response in the later period seems more delayed and persistent. For the response of the PCE 
deflator, it appears to have been considerably reduced in the post-1984Q1 periods, compared to 
the earlier period. 
 
Comparison with the VAR approach. Given that the existing literature has investigated this type 
of questions in the context of VARs, it is interesting at this stage to compare the FAVAR results 
for aggregate price and real activity measures with those that would be obtained from a VAR. 
Based on preliminary exploration, we have found the VAR results to be very sensitive to the 
specification and the price puzzle – the fact that prices increase following a tightening of 
monetary policy – to be pervasive across the different periods. The inclusion of an index of 
commodity prices to the VAR did not resolve the price puzzle. However, the inclusion of a 
measure of expected inflation in the VAR leads to estimates that eliminate the price puzzle in the 
post-1984:1 period. The facts that adding more information to the VAR – through the inclusion 
of an expected inflation measure – helps eliminate the price puzzle in the later sample and that 
the FAVAR does not display the puzzle, lead us to believe that it is indeed an anomaly of the 
simpler VAR specification as opposed to a genuine feature of the economy.  
Our benchmark VAR specification is thus based on a subset of the macroeconomic 
indicators used in the previous FAVAR analysis that comprises quarterly data on real GDP, the 
personal consumption expenditure deflator, a commodity price index, a measure of expected   ‐37‐
inflation and the Fed funds rate.
18 We identify the monetary policy shock recursively with the 
Fed funds rate ordered last, the VAR equivalent of the identification strategy used in the 
FAVAR. The impulse responses of real GDP, the PCE deflator and the Fed funds rate to a 
monetary policy shock are reported in Figure 3.  
The results for aggregate real activity are very similar to those based on the FAVAR. 
This is particularly remarkable since the FAVAR is estimated at the monthly frequency and uses 
an entirely different set of information. The response of aggregate prices is however markedly 
different. While the VAR suggests that the pre-1979Q3 response of aggregate prices is also of a 
greater magnitude than for the post-1984Q1 period, unlike the FAVAR results, the response in 
the earlier period displays an important price puzzle. This would be consistent with the fact that 
the VAR is omitting important information that the FAVAR succeeds at extracting from a large 
set of indicators. 
 
Multidimensional effects of monetary policy. The FAVAR framework also allows us to 
document the changing effect of monetary on a wide range of macroeconomic indicators. This 
provides an interesting way to check if the conclusions we have reached are also valid for 
disaggregated components or alternative measures of real activity and prices.  
These results are reported in Figure 4. These results highlight the fact that the general 
pattern uncovered so far seems to be shared by a large set of relevant indicators. Alternative 
measures of aggregate prices, such as the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and core CPI, show a 
                                                            
18 We use a 3-year ahead expected inflation measure extracted from the term structure of interest rate (see Section V 
for details on this measure). The variables in the VAR are all in log-level, except the Fed funds rate and expected 
inflation which are in levels.   ‐38‐
reduction in the effect of monetary policy shock post-1984Q1.  Measures related to real activity 
also display a behavior broadly consistent with real GDP in response to monetary policy. The 
response of industrial production, capacity utilization, employment, housing starts, and orders for 
durable goods are somewhat smaller initially in the first year to two years, while their shape 
suggests a more protracted response after 1980 (albeit with wide confidence intervals). 
Consumer credit displays a similar pattern. 
Overall, our reading of the new evidence is as follows. There is some of evidence of an 
evolution in the response of prices and expenditure categories to monetary policy, both in terms 
of magnitude and timing. The effect of monetary policy on aggregate real activity seems to have 
become smaller in the post-1984 compared to the earlier period, and perhaps more persistent as 
well (although the latter is difficult to assess, given the confidence intervals at longer horizons).  
 
V. WHAT CAUSED THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM TO EVOLVE? 
 
The previous results are suggestive of an evolving effect of monetary policy on real 
activity, or on some of its components, and inflation. But to understand the policy implications of 
these changes, we need to know the reasons of these changes and which particular channels are 
involved.    
To try to isolate the source of the evolution of monetary policy, and which of its channels 
might have been involved, we consider two broad approaches. First the changing response of 
some particular variables to monetary policy might be informative about the changing nature of   ‐39‐
some specific channels. In particular, a differentiated response of inflation expectations to the 
same policy shock over time could be informative about the varying strength of the expectation 
channel. Or a changing response of the external finance premium to a policy shock, and how this 
evolution correlates with the growth of the shadow banking sector, might be suggestive of a 
change in the strength in the lending channel.  The second strategy is to consider lessons 
regarding the evolution of the monetary transmission mechanism that can be gleaned from a 




The expectation channel: As discussed in Section II, one channel through which monetary policy 
exerts its influence on the economy is by the effect it might have on private sector expectations.  
One way to investigate the potentially changing role of the expectation channel is to 
document the responses of measures of expected inflation to monetary policy shocks over 
different periods. We consider a total of 4 alternative measures of expected inflation. The first 
four are constructed from term structure of nominal interest rate. They are constructed, as in 
Canova and Gambetti (forthcoming) , as the predicted value from a regression of realized PCE 
inflation at a given horizon on a constant and the corresponding forward nominal interest rate.  
We do this for horizons 1, 3, 5 and 10.  The logic behind such measures is simple – changes in 
far forward rates must primarily reflect changes in inflation, as real interest rates presumably 
converge to some “normal” value at far horizons (as argued in, for example, Gurkaynak, Sack, 
and Swanson (2005)).  The next measure is survey-based – the one-year ahead expectation of   ‐40‐
CPI inflation from the Michigan Survey, which is available monthly since 1978.  The other two 
are the one-year ahead expectation of CPI inflation and of the GDP implicit deflator inflation 
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, available quarterly respectively since 1981 and 
1970. 
Figure 5 reports the FAVAR-based estimates of the responses of these alternative 
measures of expected inflation to monetary policy shock. The results suggest a considerable 
reduction in the effect of monetary policy shock on expected inflation based on the term 
structure or from the Michigan survey.  Because of their availability, an estimate of the responses 
of expected inflation from the Survey of Professional forecasters is not available in the earlier 
period.  However, consistent with the other measures, they respond very little to monetary policy 
shock in the post-1979Q4 period.  In sum, we conclude that the evidence suggests a better 
anchoring of inflation expectations in the period following the Volcker disinflation. 
 
The balance sheet channel: The balance channel of monetary policy suggests that monetary 
policy can exert on influence on the economy by affecting firms and consumers balance sheets 
and in turn, their access to credit.  The FAVAR results above already noted a reduction in the 
response of credit following a policy innovation, although this finding does not distinguish 
between the responses of the supply of credit and the demand for credit. 
  To investigate empirically how the strength of other balance-sheet channels might have 
evolved over time, we document the responses of alternatives measures of external finance 
premium to a monetary policy shock across different periods. We consider the spread between 
the yields on AAA or BAA corporate bonds and corresponding U.S. Treasury bonds, for   ‐41‐
maturities of 1, 3, 5 and 10 years, as well as the external finance premium measure of Gilchrist, 
Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009).
19 All of these measures are included is the data set, Xt, used to 
estimate the FAVAR. 
  Results are reported in Figure 6. The overall conclusion that seems to emerge is that the 
magnitude of response of corporate spreads is somewhat smaller in the first year in the recent 
period while perhaps also being more persistent during this period. Unfortunately, because of 
data availability, we do not have an estimate of the response for Gilchrist et al. measure of 
external finance premium for the pre-1979:9 period.  But its response in the post-1984:1 appears 
consistent with the one obtained for the other measures. 
 
Evidence from a Completely Specified Structural Model 
 
We now turn to a discussion of how the transmission process may have evolved in a 
structural model.  We employ a relatively standard New-Keynesian DSGE model.  This 
framework has three key features that allow us to build on our FAVAR-based analysis: It allows 
a discussion of structural features, including monetary policy behavior; it emphasizes the 
potential role for expectations management in influencing monetary transmission, as highlighted 
in the New-Keynesian literature; and it is a framework used widely in research and policy 
environments, as discussed earlier. 
 
                                                            
19 Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009) construct their measure from a portfolio of bonds prices on outstanding 
senior unsecured debt issued by a large panel of nonfinancial firms.   ‐42‐
The Model: The starting point for our specification is the model of Smets and Wouters (2007).  
We extend the model along two dimensions.  First, we disaggregate investment spending into 
consumer durable expenditures, residential investment, and business investment, as in the 
Federal Reserve’s EDO DSGE model (Edge, Kiley, and Laforte, 2007, 2008, forthcoming); such 
a disaggregation allows our analysis to connect with the large literature we summarized earlier 
that examines the impact of monetary policy on these spending categories.  In addition, we add a 
financial accelerator, inspired by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and following Gilchrist, 
Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009) closely; this addition allows some consideration of a credit (non-
neoclassical) channel. 
As the basic framework follows these earlier contributions closely, we present the model 
briefly and in its log-linear form.  Table 3 presents the list of model variables. 
  The IS block of the model consists of the optimality conditions governing consumption 
(c(t)) and investment (in durables, d(t), residential investment, h(t), and nonresidential 
investment, i(t)) decisions. 
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These equations are standard: Consumption depends upon future and past consumption (where 
habit persistence yields the inclusion of the latter), the policy interest rate (r(t)) minus expected 
inflation (π(t+1)) and a risk premium shock (b(t)); investment in each category depends upon q(t)   ‐43‐
for the relevant type of capital (and an i.i.d. shock to the q/investment relation (εΞ(t) for durables, 
residential investment, and nonresidential investment), and q is a function of the risk-premium 
adjusted short rate (rk(t)) and the marginal product (mpk(t)) of the associated type of capital – 
where these marginal products are determined by the economy’s production function for 
business capital (which includes variable utilization, z(t)) and the households preferences for 
consumer durable and residential capital.  Of particular interest are the capital adjustment cost 
parameters (Φ), as these determine the short-run elasticities of investment expenditures to q and 
hence govern (in part) the responsiveness of such expenditures to monetary policy. 
  The financial block consists of the equations determining the endogenous risk premia and 
the evolution of the net worth of the agents who finance investment projects.  Following the 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator framework, these premia depend 
upon the net worth of the agents financing such projects (n(t)) and the amount of capital 
expenditures financed (i.e., on leverage).  We arbitrarily assume that each type of project is 
financed by a different class of entrepreneurs, implying that the risk premia are specific to each 
investment type; a more natural framework may have been to have a set of financing constraints 
jointly influencing all household expenditures, as in models like Iacoviello (2005). 
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The spread terms represent exogenous movements in the risk premia associated with financing 
investment.  In these equations, the parameters ν, which govern the sensitivity of the external 
finance premia to variations in the leverage associated with each type of investment (q+k-n), 
provide the only non-neoclassical channel in this model.  As a result, pure credit-type channels   ‐44‐
are not present, and we will highlight the implications of this absence for our empirical findings 
and subsequent research. 
  The supply block consists of the resource constraints – the GDP identity, the production 
function depending on business capital, hours, and utilization, an optimality condition for capital 
utilization, and the capital accumulation equations – and Phillips curves determining price and 
wage inflation. 
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  The nominal interest rate is set by the monetary authority according to a simple policy 
rule involving price inflation and a traditional output gap, defined as the deviation of output from 
the level consistent with labor input and utilization at their long-run levels. 
(16)               1      1                            1                    
Finally, we include an equation for a long-term interest rate (rl(t)), based on the expectations 
hypothesis and an exogenous term premia (tp(t)).  We also consider an expectations-hypothesis 
based equation for a long-term bond associated with entrepreneurs financing of investment, as 
the data we will use on interest-rate spreads are based on long-term debt: 
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  We estimate the model for two periods, 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 and 1984Q1 to 2008Q4; 
these samples are two of the periods we have emphasized in our VAR analysis.  We use twelve 
data series: the growth rates (in real terms) of GDP, nondurables and services consumption, 
durable consumption, residential investment, and nonresidential investment; detrended hours per 
capita; GDP price inflation; the nominal federal funds rate; the nominal yield on a 10-year 
Treasury; and external finance premia measured as the difference between a composite yield on 
corporate BBB bonds and the 10-yr Treasury, the difference between a mortgage rate and the 5-
yr Treasury, and the difference between the interest rate on automobile loans and the 5-yr. 
Treasury. 
Table 4 presents calibrated parameters.  We choose conventional values: expenditure 
shares for consumption of nondurables and durables of about 2/3, residential and business 
investment shares of about 4 and 12 percent, and a residual demand (e.g., government) 
expenditure share of 18 percent; a quarterly discount rate of 1 percent; a depreciation rate for 
consumer durables double that of business investment and quadruple that of residential 
investment; a leverage rate in the financial accelerator of 2; a Phillips curve slope just below 0.1; 
a capital share in production of 35 percent; and other parameters (governing utilization and 
capital returns) similar to values from, for example, Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009).  
Table 5 presents prior distributions over the estimated parameters most critical for the effects of 
monetary policy – the adjustment cost parameters determining the sensitivity of investment 
spending to fundamentals (i.e., q), the parameters determining the sensitivity of risk premia to 
leverage, and the parameters in the monetary policy rule – along with estimates for the posterior 
mode and their standard deviations for each sample.  (A more complete description of our 
estimation approach and results are presented in an appendix.)   ‐46‐
Three points are evident from these estimation results.  First, the parameters of the 
monetary policy rule are substantially more reactive to inflation (   ) and output (   ) in the 
1984Q1-2008Q4 sample.  Second, the standard deviations of the exogenous shock processes are 
in several cases, including the monetary policy rule (σr), lower in the 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample.  
Both of these results suggest better policy behavior and echo findings in other studies, most 
notably Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000).  Third, the parameters governing the shape of the 
investment demand schedules (Φ ) and the response of risk premia to economic conditions (ν) 
are only modestly different across samples.  Combining these results, the most significant 
changes appear to be in monetary policy behavior, not private-sector parameters.  We now turn 
to the implications of these results for the evolution of monetary transmission. 
 
Changes in Monetary Transmission:  Our FAVAR analysis yielded three conclusions: The effect 
of monetary policy on output appears somewhat smaller at a one-to-two year horizon in the most 
recent sample, but the response of output at more distant horizons is not lower and may be more 
persistent, although standard errors are large at such horizons; inflation responds less to 
monetary policy in the recent sample; and credit and risk spreads may respond to policy actions 
less in recent samples in the short run, although responses are estimated in the FAVAR to follow 
a more drawn out trajectory in the recent sample. 
  Figure 7 presents the DSGE-based impulse responses following a 100 basis point 
increase (annual rate) in the federal funds rate (e.g., 25 basis points at a quarterly rate) for the 
two sample periods, along with the 90-percent credible set (the dashed lines) around the 1984Q1 
to 2008Q4 sample period response, for the federal funds rate, inflation, output, and the credit   ‐47‐
spread associated with business investment (where the comparable data is the 10-year BBB 
corporate bond spread from figure 6).  The results conform reasonably closely with the FAVAR 
results: Inflation responds much less to the policy innovation in the recent sample (the black line) 
relative to the response in the 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 sample (the blue line); output responds less to 
a shock to the federal funds rate in the 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample (the black line) than in the 
earlier sample (the black line), especially at horizons from one to two years; and the risk spread 
response is also more modest in the recent sample.  (However, we should emphasize that there 
are important differences from the FAVAR responses – most notably that inflation and output 
jump following a policy innovation, whereas the identifying assumption underlying the FAVAR 
responses excludes this possibility). 
  Because all changes in the model arise from a change in some structural parameter, the 
estimates for each sample can be used to identify the source of these shifts in policy 
transmission.  The first candidate is the changes in the monetary policy parameters.  Figure 8 
presents the response for the 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample and the response that would arise using 
the 1984Q1 to 2008Q1 policy parameters with all of the other structural parameters at the values 
estimated for the earlier sample.  As can be clearly seen, the shift in policy parameters brings the 
responses closely in line, indicating that the change in monetary policy behavior can account for 
the changes in the responses of inflation, output, and risk spreads.   
  Indeed, the changes in other parameters account imply little change in the responses of 
inflation, activity, and risk spreads to a policy innovation.  For example, figure 9 presents the 
1984Q1 to 2008Q4 responses and credible sets and the response that would arise using the 
1984Q1 to 2008Q1 parameters governing the sensitivity of risk spreads (ν) with all of the other 
structural parameters at the values estimated for the earlier sample; figure 10 presents the   ‐48‐
1984Q1 to 2008Q4 responses and credible sets and the response that would arise using the 
1984Q1 to 2008Q1 parameters governing the slope of the investment demand schedules (Φ ) 
with all of the other structural parameters at the values estimated for the earlier sample.  In each 
case, the differences in impulses responses across the two samples remain intact, implying that 
little of the change in the responsiveness of activity, inflation, or risk spreads stems from private-
sector behavior. 
  Finally, we should emphasize that the shifts in monetary policy behavior we detect are 
similar to the findings in many other studies (e.g., Boivin and Giannoni, 2006).  With that said, 
this finding has attracted some controversy: For example, Sims and Zha (2006) follow a less 
structured approach than ours and show that, under some assumptions, the finding of a shift in 
monetary policy behavior, other than the variance of the shock, is not always clear.  Moreover, 
Smets and Wouters (2007), employing a similar methodology to our DSGE approach, find no 
changes in monetary policy behavior.  In part this difference likely reflects their specification of 
the monetary policy rule (which responds to the deviation of output from flexible price output, 
rather than from a production-function gap as we choose) and other aspects of their specification. 
Indeed, any analysis with a structural model will be impacted by all the model’s assumptions.  
With that said, other DSGE-based analyses reach similar conclusions regarding monetary policy 
behavior (e.g., Arestis, Chortareas, and Tsoukalas, 2010).  More generally, our findings are in 
line with those from the policy-rule literature, most notably Taylor (1999) and Clarida, Gali, and 
Gertler (2000), giving us confidence in our qualitative conclusions. 
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Signs of changing credit conditions: A straight read of these results might suggesting that there 
have not been significant changes over time in the importance of non-neoclassical channels, as 
the parameters of the financial accelerator in our DSGE model have not changed in a way 
notable enough to have effects on the economy’s response to monetary policy shifts.  However, 
we interpret our estimation results as suggesting that the most widely adopted version of this 
channel in quantitative macroeconomic models, the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) 
financial accelerator mechanism, does not provide much information on such changes.  One 
possible reason for this is that the effects of financial accelerator-type mechanisms are nonlinear, 
and not picked up in the linear framework we consider.
20  Another possibility is that the financial 
accelerator framework largely works through an amplification mechanism associated with 
external finance premia, and ignores other aspects of credit provision.   
  Indeed, one of the results from our DSGE analysis points in this direction.  Specifically, 
an economically significant change related to residential investment is evident in the change in 
the standard deviation of the shock to its equation (4) (which, as shown in table A1, drops from 
just above 2 to a minuscule value near 0), implying that more of the fluctuations in residential 
investment in the recent sample represent movements along this curve, rather than deviations 
from the model’s implied relationship.  Of course, the model does not include the quantity 
rationing induced by regulation or other non-price channels of monetary transmission, and hence 
this type of model is perhaps not especially informative about shifts in such channels across the 
sample periods we consider.  Nonetheless, the smaller variance of shocks to this relationship in 
the 1984Q1-2008q4 sample period is consistent with the findings in McCarthy and Peach (2002), 
                                                            
20 Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009) find very small accelerator effects following a monetary policy innovation 
for their estimated DSGE model; much of the importance of financial shocks in their results stems from the 
exogenous shocks to the financial sector, rather than through the endogenous propagation mechanism.    ‐50‐
who report a closer association of housing market variables with interest rates and other 
neoclassical fundamentals for that period.   
Indeed, we can even be a little bit more suggestive: For example, periods of credit 
rationing associated with disintermediation from falling deposits at savings and loans 
associations during the 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 period were identified in Brayton and Mauskopf 
(1985) to have occurred in 1966Q3-Q4, 1969Q3-1970Q3, and 1974Q1-1957Q1.  For these 
periods, the mean “off-equation” movements in residential investment (e.g., shock) equaled -3 
percent (with a t-statistic of -4.3); in comparison, the mean of such shocks in periods without 
credit constraints was 0.7 percent (with a t-statistic of 2.3).
21   In other words, these shocks 
appear tightly linked to credit conditions, with credit rationing especially important for 
residential investment.  Moreover, the decline in the importance of this shock in the 1984Q1 to 
2008Q4 sample points to a lessening in the importance of credit per se. 
 
Monetary Policy and the Transmission of Other Shocks: Our analysis highlights the central role 
of monetary policy behavior in the evolution of the transmission of monetary shocks. 
  Of course, the endogenous aspect of monetary policy is crucial for the behavior of 
activity and inflation following other shocks – implying that the shift in behavior on the part of 
monetary policymakers could have even more significant effects on the nature of economic 
fluctuations through its impact on the effect of fundamentals other than policy shocks.  We 
consider the response of the policy interest rate, output, and inflation to a one-standard deviation 
shock to productivity and to the economy-wide risk premia; these shocks are the most important 
                                                            
21 This shock process is estimated, implying a mean of about zero (0.1) (and a small t-statistic for the entire sample 
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shocks for output fluctuations in our model and in other similar DSGE models (e.g., Smets and 
Wouters, 2007, and especially to Federal Reserve and ECB policy models described in Kiley, 
2009, and Christoffel, Coenen, and Warne, 2008).  Moreover, these two shocks illustrate well the 
nature of policy tradeoffs facing policymakers: An improvement in productivity increases output 
and lowers inflation, and a policymaker will hope to accommodate the improvement in output 
and stabilize inflation in response to such a shock; in contrast, an increase in the risk premia will 
depress output and inflation, and a policymaker will aim to offset these effects and stabilize both 
output and inflation.  In our comparisons, we compare the impulse responses using the 1984Q1-
2008Q4 parameter estimates and altering the policy parameters to those for the earlier period in 
our alternative case. 
Figure 11 presents the impulse responses following a productivity shock.  The differences 
implied by the change in policy rule are dramatic – output responds more, and inflation less, to 
the innovation in productivity.  Figure 12 presents the results for a risk premia shock.  In this 
case, the more active policy response to inflation in the recent sample period serves to stabilize 
both activity and inflation.  These figures show that the most important impact of monetary 
policy is through its affect on how other shocks are transmitted to inflation and activity.  And the 
nature of our findings – that monetary policy has shifted since the early 1980s to a stance that 
accommodates productivity innovations and resists demand-side fluctuations – is consistent with 
other results in the literature, most clearly those of Galí and Gambetti (2009), who investigate 
similar issues using a less structural (VAR-based) approach. 
In both cases, the changes in the responses to shocks move in the direction of more 
desirable economic outcomes.  And in both cases, the large effects of the change in the policy 
rule are driven by expectations: This can be seen by looking at the response of the nominal   ‐52‐
interest rate – which is actually smaller under the more active policy in both cases, because the 
commitment to a highly reactive policy stabilizes expectations and hence actual outcomes 
without generating additional realized volatility in the nominal interest rate. 
These results drive home two points that are central to the evolution of economist’s 
understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism.   
First, the systematic component of policy and its effect on the macroeconomic response 
to a wide range of shocks is the principle mechanism through which monetary policy affects 
inflation and activity.  This transmission channel is the primary focus of modern studies of the 
effects of monetary policy, following the large literature on the effects of policy rules on 
economic performance (e.g., the literature summarized in the chapter on policy rules by Taylor 
and Williams, 2010) and the emphasis on managing expectations through systematic behavior 
presented in Woodford (2003).  This evolution is significant, as the primary focus of policy 
discussions of the transmission mechanism in the past has centered on model analyses or 
simulations that focus on exogenous paths for policy – with at most glancing attention to the 
systematic nature of policy, expectations formation, and the transmission of policy actions.  
(Examples that did not emphasize expectations include the equation-by-equation approach of 
Akhtar and Harris, 1987, or Friedman, 1989, analyses with the Federal Reserve’s MPS model 
(Mauskopf, 1990) or the central bank comparisons, representing a large number of policy models 
employed in the early-to-mid 1990s, presented in Smets, 1995).   
Second, a greater emphasis on inflation stabilization is likely to lead to greater stability in 
inflation but not necessarily in output, as a focus on price stability will accommodate increases in 
output reflecting productivity advances and resist such movements due to fluctuations in risk   ‐53‐
premia or some other demand factors.  This latter point suggests that studies that look to identify 
the importance of changes in the transmission mechanism related to policy behavior through the 
lens of overall output stability may fail to find strong evidence.  This may help explain, in part, 
the diversity of findings in this area (e.g., the different conclusions of Boivin and Giannoni, 2006 
and Canova and Gambetti, 2009, for example).  The subtle difference between overall output 
stability and stability in output around an efficient level – i.e., the notion that policymakers 
should design policy so as to accommodate productivity movements while resisting inefficient 
movements due to risk premia – has also represented an important evolution in understanding 
regarding how the monetary transmission mechanism should be used to promote price stability.   
 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF MONETARY POLICY 
 
  Looking back over our summary of related literature, four findings are apparent.   
First, the neoclassical channels – direct interest rate effects on investment spending, 
wealth and intertemporal substitution effects on consumption, and the trade effects through the 
exchange rate – have remained the core channels in macroeconomic modeling.   The literature on 
time variation in the strength of these channels has not suggested large changes over time.  
Second, the macroeconomic literature on non-neoclassical channels in general 
equilibrium models is sparse – most analyses of the potential importance of, for example, bank-
based channels has focused on heterogeneous effects on different classes of borrowers or lenders 
that could signal a potential role for such channels, without moving on to the macroeconomic 
consequences.  Macroeconomic models that incorporate such channels, most notable a balance   ‐54‐
sheet channel like that of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), find only modest effects on 
monetary transmission from these factors, as we found in our DSGE model exercises.  Indeed, 
the variation in external finance premia in such empirical models seems more important as a 
source of shocks driving fluctuations than as an endogenous transmission mechanism. 
Third, there have been large changes in the regulatory structure in the United States and 
other countries, and these changes have had important implications for the transmission of 
monetary policy actions to residential investment.  In particular, residential investment is now 
more tied to interest rates rather than credit availability.  Some aspects of these shifts are 
apparent in our macro-based approaches.  For example, credit seems to respond more slowly and 
by a smaller amount to policy shifts in our FAVAR analysis (figure 5) in the period after 1982; 
similarly, shocks to the residential investment equation in our DSGE model are tightly linked to 
periods of credit rationing in the pre-1980 period, but of minimal importance in the later sample.  
With that said, these results only hint at the role of credit per se in different periods, and fail to 
speak to the more global issue of the role of financial frictions in economic fluctuations.  
Finally, monetary policy has become substantially more focused on inflation 
stabilization, and this shift has importantly affected the volatility of inflation and the response of 
output to non-monetary disturbances.  Indeed, the systematic component of monetary policy is 
the most important monetary factor in economic fluctuations, and the evolution of economist’s 
understanding of how to use the monetary transmission mechanism through a systematic focus 
on price stability is one of the central shifts in policy behavior and macroeconomic modeling 
over the last quarter century.  These results emerge quite clearly from our structural model 
analysis, and echo findings from some studies that impose less structure.   ‐55‐
This summary leaves two extremely important outstanding questions for research.  One is 
the role of non-neoclassical channels in our understanding of economic fluctuations and 
monetary policy.  The literature in this area remains thin, and this thinness reflects difficulty in 
specifying the relevant mechanisms and finding the supporting empirical evidence.  While we 
are able to hint at the importance of such channels at times in the past, this area is currently very 
active and will undoubtedly yield future insights (e.g., Meh and Moran, 2008; Angeloni and 
Faia, 2010; Gerali et al, 2009; and Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010).  Indeed, the global financial 
crisis that began in mid-2007 has illustrated that the intersection of banking, finance, and 
macroeconomics is as important as ever. 
The course of policy following the crisis has also shown the importance of understanding 
aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism further.  In particular, policy rates have been 
brought to near zero in the United States, Europe, and Japan.  As a result, the importance of 
managing expectations in such an environment has been brought to the fore.  In addition, central 
banks around the world have engaged in “quantitative easing” or “large-scale asset purchases” in 
an effort to impart additional impetus to activity.  But both the empirical and theoretical channels 
(e.g., Clouse et al, 2000, and Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack, 2004) associated with such actions 
remain far less developed than desirable. Also, some of the policy recommendations in reaction 
to the crisis, such as the implementation of macroprudential regulations, are likely to have an 
important on the evolution of the monetary transmission mechanism going forward.   ‐56‐
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Table 1: Monetary Policy Transmission Channels 







Changes in short-term policy rates 
affect the user cost of capital for 
consumer and business investment 
Standard in large-scale models 
(like the MPS or FRB/US models, 
Fair, 2004) and DSGE models.   
Wealth effects  Changes in short-term interest rates 
affect discounted present values 
and/or Tobin’s Q for various types 
of assets, and these changes in the 
market value of assets induce 
changes in consumption 
Standard in the large-scale models 
models (MPS or FRB/US, Fair, 
2004). Standard in DSGE models, 
but not separated from 
intertemporal substitution effects 
Intertemporal 
substitution 
Changes in short-term interest rates 
affect the slope of the consumption 
profile 
Absent from traditional large-scale.  
Standard in DSGE models, but not 
separated from wealth effects. 
Exchange rate 
effects 
Changes in short-run policy interest 
rates induce changes in the 
exchange rate through uncovered-
interest parity and/or portfolio 
balance effects 
Standard in large-scale models.   
Incorporated in international DSGE 







Restrictions on financial 
institutions (e.g., deposit rate 
ceilings, credit restrictions) affect 
spending 
Incorporated empirically for 
relevant periods in some large-
scale models (e.g., MPS model) 
Bank-based 
channels 
Banks play a special role 
addressing problems of asymmetric 
information. Thus, decreases in 
bank’s lending capacity impact 
spending 
Not explicitly incorporated in most 




Changes in net worth associated 
with the asset price effects of 
monetary actions influence external 
finance premia facing firms and 
households 
Not explicitly incorporated in most 
large-scale models.  Increasingly 
incorporated in DSGE models, 
often along the lines suggested in 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1999). 
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Table 2: Sources of Funding for Home Mortgages 
  GSEs  Banks  Other 
1966-1970 0.04 0.71 0.25
1986-1990 0.39 0.45 0.16
2004-2008 0.43 0.31 0.26
 
Source: Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts.  Banks refer to banks, savings and loans, and credit unions; 
the GSEs refers to GSEs and agency and GSE-backed mortgage pools.  The data come from the Flow of Funds 
accounts produced by the Federal Reserve.  ‐71‐
 
Table 3: Variables in DSGE Model 
Endogenous Variables in DSGE Model 
   
Variable Name  Symbol 
   
Expenditure components and GDP 
Consumption (ex. durables)  c(t) 
Consumption, durables  d(t) 
Residential investment  h(t) 
Business investment  i(t) 
GDP (output)  y(t) 
   
Productive inputs and household stocks 
Business, residential, and durables capital  ki(t) 
Hours worked  l(t) 
Capital utilization  z(t) 
   
Financial market variables 
Tobin's q -- business, residential, and durables capital  qi(t) 
Marginal product -- business, residential, and durables 
capital 
mpki(t) 
Return to business, residential, and durables capital  rki(t) 
Policy interest rate  r(t) 
Long-term interest rate  rl(t) 
Long-term expected return to business, residential, and 
durables capital 
rkl,i(t) 
Net worth to finance business, residential, and durables 
capital 
ni(t) 
   
Inflation and wages 
Inflation  π(t) 




Table 3 (continued): Variables in DSGE Model 
Exogenous Variables in DSGE Model 
    
Variable Name  Symbol 
    
Expenditure components and GDP 
Residual demand  g(t) 
    
Productive potential 
Productivity  a(t) 
    
Financial market   
Economywide risk premium  b(t) 
Spread (exog.) for business, residential, and durables  spread(t) 
Term premium  tp(t) 
    
Shocks in DSGE Model    Symbol 
    
Expenditure components and GDP 
Residual demand  eg(t) 
    
Productive potential and markups 
Productivity  ea(t) 
Price markup  eπ(t) 
    
Financial market   
Monetary policy  er(t) 
Economywide risk premium  eb(t) 
Spread (exog.) for business, residential, and durables  espread(t) 
Term premium  etp(t) 





Calibrated Parameters for DSGE 
Model 













RKx, x=d,h,i  1/Β -(1-δx)






Estimated Parameters for DSGE Model       




  Distribution Mean  S.D.  Mode  S.D. Mode  S.D. 
ζ  Beta 0.75 0.20 0.79 0.10 0.35  0.12
Φi  Normal 2.00 0.50 2.14 0.52 0.57  0.40
Φd  Normal 2.00 0.50 3.08 0.39 2.71  0.41
Φh  Normal 2.00 0.50 2.95 0.53 0.83  0.25
νi  Beta 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.05  0.01
νd  Beta 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.05  0.01
νh  Beta 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04  0.01
ρr  Beta 0.75 0.10 0.72 0.00 0.72  0.05
rπ  Normal 1.50 0.25 1.00 0.00 1.71  0.23
ry  Normal 0.50 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.20  0.03








Figure 1: Correlation between measures of activity and demand (log-differences), the long-term 
interest rate, and and the nominal federal funds rate .  The blue bars denote the correlation 
between the nominal funds rate (lagged/led) and the data series indicated for the 1962Q1 to 





Figure 2: FAVAR-evidence of the aggregate effect of monetary policy. Impulse response 
functions to a 25bp surprise increase in the Fed funds rate, estimated from the FAVAR model 
described in the text. Shaded areas represent the 95% confidence interval on the post-1984 
estimates.   ‐77‐
 
Figure 3: VAR-based evidence of the aggregate effect of monetary policy. Impulse 
response functions to a 25bp surprise increase in the Fed funds rate, estimated from the 




Figure 4: Multidimensional effects of monetary policy. Impulse response functions to a 25bp 
surprise increase in the Fed funds rate, estimated from the FAVAR model described in the text. 
Shaded areas represent the 95% confidence interval on the post-1984 estimates.   ‐79‐
 
 
Figure 5: FAVAR-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy on expected inflation. Impulse 
response functions to a 25bp surprise increase in the Fed funds rate, estimated from the FAVAR 
model described in the text. Note that the Survey of Professional Forecasters measure of 
expected inflation is not available at the monthly frequency. Shaded areas represent the 95% 




Figure 6: FAVAR-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy on external finance premium. 
Impulse response functions to a 25bp surprise increase in the Fed funds rate, estimated from the 
FAVAR model described in the text. Note that the Survey of Professional Forecasters measure of 
expected inflation is not available at the monthly frequency. Shaded areas represent the 95% 




Figure 7: DSGE model-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy in two sample periods. 
Impulse response functions to a 100bp (a.r.) surprise increase in the Fed funds rate in the DSGE 
model described in the text. The blue, solid line is the response at the 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 sample 
period parameter estimates; the black line is the response for the 1984Q1-2008Q4 sample period, 
and the black, dashed lines are the 90-percent credible set around these estimates.  The units on 
the x-axis represent quarters.   ‐82‐
 
 
Figure 8: DSGE model-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy in two sample periods, 
change in policy parameters. Impulse response functions to a 100bp (a.r.) surprise increase in the 
Fed funds rate in the DSGE model described in the text. The blue, solid line is the response at the 
1962Q1 to 1979Q3 sample period parameter estimates, with the monetary policy parameters set 
to their 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample period estimates; the black line is the response for the 
1984Q1-2008Q4 sample period, and the black, dashed lines are the 90-percent credible set 
around these estimates.  The units on the x-axis represent quarters. 
   ‐83‐
 
Figure 9: DSGE model-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy in two sample periods, 
change in risk-premia (financial accelerator) parameters. Impulse response functions to a 100bp 
(a.r.) surprise increase in the Fed funds rate in the DSGE model described in the text. The blue, 
solid line is the response at the 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 sample period parameter estimates, with the 
risk-premia/financial accelerator parameters set to their 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample period 
estimates; the black line is the response for the 1984Q1-2008Q4 sample period, and the black, 




Figure 10: DSGE model-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy in two sample periods, 
change in investment demand schedule (adjustment cost) parameters. Impulse response 
functions to a 100bp (a.r.) surprise increase in the Fed funds rate in the DSGE model described 
in the text. The blue, solid line is the response at the 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 sample period parameter 
estimates, with the adjustment cost parameters set to their 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample period 
estimates; the black line is the response for the 1984Q1-2008Q4 sample period, and the black, 





Figure 11: DSGE model-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy: Change in policy-rule 
parameters and productivity shock.  Impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation 
surprise increase in productivity. The blue, solid line is the response at the 1984Q1-2008Q4  
sample period parameter estimates; the black, solid line is the response if the parameters of the 
monetary policy rule are set to the values estimated for the 1962Q1-1979Q3 sample period.  The 
units on the x-axis represent quarters.   ‐86‐
 
 
Figure 12: DSGE model-based evidence of the effect of monetary policy: Change in policy-rule 
parameters and risk-premium shock.  Impulse response functions to a one-standard deviation 
surprise increase in the economy-wide risk premium. The blue, solid line is the response at the 
1984Q1-2008Q4 sample period parameter estimates; the black, solid line is the response if the 
parameters of the monetary policy rule are set to the values estimated for the 1962Q1-1979Q3 
sample period.  The units on the x-axis represent quarters.  ‐87‐
 
Appendix: Estimation of DSGE model 
  The DSGE model presented in the main text is estimated using Bayesian methods using 
the observable variables mentioned in the text: the real growth rates of GDP, nondurables and 
services consumption (excluding housing services), residential investment, nonresidential fixed 
investment, the percent change in the GDP deflator, hours worked in the nonfarm business sector 
(divided by the civilian noninstitutional population, and detrended with the HP filter), the 
nominal federal funds rate, the nominal yield on the 10-year Treasury, and risk spreads on 
corporate bonds, the car loan rate, and the fixed mortgage rate.  The estimated parameters are 
found by maximizing the log posterior function, which combines the prior information on the 
parameters with the likelihood of the data.  We assume a small amount of measurement error on 
all the observable data, except the nominal funds rate and nominal Treasury yield.  (The degree 
of assumed measurement error is reported in the appendix Table A1.) 
  Each of the exogenous processes follow autoregressive (AR(1)) processes.  The estimated 
AR(1) coefficients and standard deviations for all of the shocks to these processes are also 




22 The 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 sample is conditioned on observations for 1983Q1 to 1983Q4 (to initialize the Kalman 
filter); these observations are not used in the computation of the likelihood.  The first year of observations condition 
the filter for the 1962Q1 to 1979Q3 sample; data availability do not allow conditioning on earlier data for that case.   ‐88‐
 
Appendix Table A1: 
Additional Estimated Parameters for DSGE Model   




  Distribution Mean  S.D.  Mode  S.D.  Mode  S.D. 
ρa  Beta 0.50  0.20 0.89 0.13 0.91  0.02 
ρtp  Beta 0.50  0.20 0.46 0.00 0.84  0.03 
ρb  Beta 0.50  0.20 0.65 0.41 0.88  0.03 
ρg  Beta 0.50  0.20 0.45 0.37 0.50  0.25 
ρfi  Beta 0.50  0.10 0.65 1.52 0.53  0.09 
ρfd  Beta 0.50  0.10 0.56 0.10 0.57  0.09 
ρfh  Beta 0.50  0.10 0.49 0.61 0.75  0.09 
σa  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.73 0.19 0.36  0.08 
σπ  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.23 0.04 0.18  0.03 
σb  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.87 1.77 0.16  0.04 
σg  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.78 0.88 0.05  0.02 
σfi  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.53 1.44 0.05  0.02 
σfd  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.06 0.06 0.57  0.19 
σfh  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.37 2.52 0.19  0.07 
σi  Invg 0.10  2.00 3.70 0.39 2.27  0.27 
σd  Invg 0.10  2.00 1.47 0.32 1.49  0.19 
σh  Invg 0.10  2.00 2.28 0.19 0.05  0.02 
σtp  Invg 0.10  2.00 0.05 0.00 0.02  0.00 
Measurement Errors on Observables for DSGE Model   
σΔy  0.36   σl   0.70    
σΔc  0.18    σfd   0.13    
σΔi  1.00    σfh   0.13    
σΔd  1.00   σfi   0.13    
σΔh  1.00   σΔp   0.18    
 